2009

Articles

• Tomala, Tristan . Perfect Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring. Games and Economic Behavior. Volume 67. n° 2. 2009. pages 682-694. Elsevier. DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.02.005.
• Tomala, Tristan ; Laraki, Rida ; Gossner, Olivier . Informationally optimal correlation. Mathematical Programming. Volume 116. n° 1-2. 2009. pages 147-172. Springer. DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10107-007-0129-1.

Documents de travail

• Horner, Johannes ; Lovo, Stefano ; Tomala, Tristan . Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information: Characterization and Existence. Université Paris-Dauphine . 2009 .

2008

Articles

• Scarsini, Marco ; Renault, Jérôme ; Tomala, Tristan . Playing off-line games with bounded rationality. Mathematical Social Sciences. Volume 56. n° 2. 2008. pages 207-223. Elsevier. DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.01.005.
• Renault, Jérôme ; Tomala, Tristan . Probabilistic Reliability and Privacy of Communication Using Multicast in General Neighbor Networks. Journal of Cryptology. Volume 21. n° 2. 2008. pages 250-279. Springer. DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00145-007-9018-2.
• Gossner, Olivier ; Tomala, Tristan . Entropy Bounds on Bayesian Learning. Journal of Mathematical Economics. Volume 44. n° 1. 2008. pages 24-32. Elsevier. DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.04.006.

2007

Articles

• Gossner, Olivier ; Tomala, Tristan . Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring. Mathematics of Operations Research. Volume 32. n° 2. 2007. pages 413-424. Informs. DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/moor.1060.0248.
• Renault, Jérôme ; Scarsini, Marco ; Tomala, Tristan . A minority game with bounded recall. Mathematics of Operations Research. Volume 32. n° 4. 2007. pages 873-889. INFORMS. DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/moor.1070.0284.

2006

Articles

• Tomala, Tristan ; Gossner, Olivier . Empirical Distributions of Beliefs Under Imperfect Observation. Mathematics of Operations Research. Volume 31. n° 1. 2006. pages 13-30. Informs. DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/moor.1050.0174.

2005

Documents de travail

• Gossner, Olivier ; Tomala, Tristan . The controlled biased coin problem. Université Paris-Dauphine . 2005 .

2004

Articles

• Renault, Jérôme ; Tomala, Tristan . Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Games and Economic Behavior. Volume 49. n° 2. 2004. pages 313-344. Elsevier. DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.12.005.
• Renault, Jérôme ; Tomala, Tristan . Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals. Games and Economic Behavior. Volume 47. n° 1. 2004. pages 124-156. Elsevier. DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00153-2.

Documents de travail

• Gossner, Olivier ; Laraki, Rida ; Tomala, Tristan . Maxmin computation and optimal correlation in repeated games with signals. Ecole Polytechnique . 2004 .

2003

Documents de travail

• Gossner, Olivier ; Tomala, Tristan . Entropy and codification in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Université Paris-Dauphine . 2003 .